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IC 74-2092
18 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:



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SUBJECT:

17 October Meeting of Ad Hoc
Watch Committee

1. At the beginning of this meeting I indicated that, in spite of the broad-ranging discussion at the 30 September meeting, the Lehman proposal was the only specific plan available to the committee. I proposed that the meeting be devoted to a more detailed review of the provisions of the Lehman paper with the object of identifying areas of consensus and disagreement. I then asked for members' reaction to this way of proceeding.

2. In response, the DIA representative circulated the attached letter from General Tighe to the DCI; and the State, NSA, and Air Force representatives circulated brief, informal papers which addressed primarily the question of the warning mechanism's scope and responsibilities.

3. After reviewing these materials, I said I thought the committee was confronted with three broad issues: (a) the mission of the revised warning mechanism; (b) its subordination (whether under USIB or delegated to DIA as proposed by General Graham); and (c) the specifics of organization, composition, location, and product. I suggested that there was little point in addressing points (b) and (c) until (a) had been resolved and proposed that the meeting address that issue first. This was agreed to and, after two hours of discussion, produced the following apparent consensus:

'The warning mechanism should be responsible for the earliest possible warning of military action by Soviet/Warsaw Pact, Peoples' Republic of China, or North Korean forces directed against the US, its allies, or one another. It should also be responsible for warning of action by these forces in developing crisis situations.

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in any area, which could lead to conflict with US forces." (I use "apparent" above, because after the meeting the State representative indicated that he still thought the statement too narrow and restrictive.)

4. It was agreed that the foregoing statement would be cleared informally with the members' principals.

5. The next meeting is on 23 October and, assuming no backsliding on point (a) above, will move on to points (b) and (c).

6. Although the matter was not discussed in detail at the 17 October meeting, it was evident that there was little, if any, support for General Graham's proposal to have the strategic warning responsibility delegated to DIA. CIA (Lehman), NSA, and State are clearly strongly opposed to it.

7. I recommend that we and Lehman meet with Mr. Colby early next week to brief him on the outcome of the 17 October committee meeting and to try to get him to take a position against delegating the warning function to DIA. (The other proposals of the Tighe letter seem to me negotiable.) Lehman recommends that Carver and Proctor or Walsh also attend the meeting.

8. Attached is a proposed draft of a DCI reply to General Tighe's letter. I suggest it be held, for possible revision, until after we have met with Mr. Colby.

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[Redacted]

Chairman
Ad Hoc Watch Committee

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Attachments (2)

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Remarks:

For review and comment to DCI.

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
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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


I have reviewed with care your, and General Graham's, thoughtful proposals on the strategic warning problem contained in your letter of 16 October and have passed the letter to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that is deliberating on the issues involved. I am informed that the Committee has made good progress in reaching a consensus on the scope and responsibilities of a revised strategic warning mechanism and is about to address the specific issues of composition, location, and procedures. Your proposals will clearly be a useful contribution to the resolution of these issues.

On the question of the subordination of the revised warning function, I do not believe it would be appropriate for me to delegate it as you suggest. As a matter of principle, I believe it is too onerous a responsibility to permit delegation. As a matter of practice, I believe there is too great an incidence of political and other non-military indicators in strategic warning to justify assigning primary responsibility for it to a military intelligence organization. For both these reasons, I favor the maintenance of some form of USIB mechanism responsible directly to me.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby



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